Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1976

Sally M. Martinez and the State of Utah v. Eugenio
Max Romero : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon B. Romney; Utah Attorney General; Stephen G. Schwendiman; Assistant Attorney General;
Attorneys for Appellants.
Samuel King; Attorney for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Martinez v. Romero, No. 197614573.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/409

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

JJTAH
DOCUMENT

WTA»*

surname

COURT

RECEIVED
LAW LIBRARY
14JUN3977
F

THE S T A T E

. ? ! . ^ 1 S ^ 1 YOUNG UNIVERSITY
J. Reuben Cz:\: Lvy School

SALLY M. MARTINEZ and the STATE OF
UTAH, by and through Utah State
Department of Social Services,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

No.

14573

-vEUGENIO MAX ROMERO,
Defendant and Respondent.
•h-

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
,

Appeal from an Order of Dismissal of the
Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, the Honorable pryant H,
Croft, presiding.

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Utah Attornejy General
STEPHEN G. SJCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Atftorney General
236 State Cabitol Building
Salt Lake Ci|ty, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellants
SAMUEL KING
409 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

ft" I L E D
JUL 6 - 1976
Cfatfi Jqjrae* ZzM- VUlh

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALLY M. MARTINEZ and the STATE OF
UTAH/ by and through UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

No. 14573

~ v EUGENIC MAX ROMERO,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF 0? APPELLANTS I

Appeal fran an Order of Dismissal in the
District Court of Salt Lake County,
Honorable Bryant H. Croft Presiding.

VERSION B. R3MNEY
Utah Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SOHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellants

Samuel King, Esq.
Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
•"-n foment of N a t u r e o c Ca^e

1

D i s p o s i t i o n m t h e Lov^i Coui i

|

I

R e l i e f Sought on Appea]
. Latement

, . .

+ ]' '"-f

1

. „ .

Argument

Point I:

Point JT:

Point III:

Lomt I

P->i?)!-

A FATHER OWES THE SAME DUTY OF SUPPORT
TO BOTH LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGITIMATE
CHILDREN . . . . , , .
.
TO BAR A PATERNITY ACTION BY A CHILD,
PARENT, OR PUBLIC AGENCY DURING THE CHILD'S
MINORITY IS A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAWS AND CF THE RIGHTS AN ILLEGITIMATF
CHILD HAS FOR SUPPORT

J

5

UTAH CODE AIINOTATED 78-12-22 IS TO BAR TO
BRINGING PATTSNITY ACTIONS, BUT IS MEANT
TO BE A STATUTE OF LEHTATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF ESTABLISHED COURT ORDERS OF SUPPORT . .

10

i CTIONS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY ARE NOT
CO:7TROLLED BY EXISTING STATUTES OF LE4I!
J \Tlf \S. THE ACT ITSELF WAS PURPOSELY
SILENT THEREON, AND TT WAS, THEREFORE,
ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO HOLD THAT
THE ACTION WAS SO CONTROLLED

14

IF ANY STATUTE OF LEOTATIONS IS FOUND
TO CONTROL, SAID LIMITATION IS TOLLED
DURING THE CHILD'S MINORITY AND AN ACTION
BROUGHT DURING THE MINORITY OF THE CHILD
IS PROPER

Coriclu'jic
CASES CITED
Armijo v. Uesselius, 73t,i.Ji. 2d 7Lo, ^'0 '.2d .i7J (lr'°)
Garvin v. Garvin, 10°» (olo. ''15, 118 P.2d 768 (1941)
Gate. \

t Le,

, 0 > I . >.

<

(197""*

. ..

u, /,

Table of Contents Cont.
Harding v. Skolfield, 125 Me. 438, 135 A. 567 (1926)

13

Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153 P.2d 262, 107 U. 239 (1944)

4

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct

9

New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S.
622, 93 S. Ct. 1700 (1973)

9

Ortega v. Portales, 134 Colo. 537, 307 P .2d 193 (1957)

15

Perez v. Singh, 21 Cal. App. 3d 870, 97 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1971) . .

23

Rees v. Archibald, 6 Utah 2d 264, 311 P.2d 788 (1957)

5, 6, 16

Rockwood v. Rockwood, 236 P. 457, 65 U. 261 (1925)

4, 16

Seely v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1975)

11, 12

Simncns v. Simons, 105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943)

11, 12

State v. 'Chri^tensen, 19 Ariz. App. 479, 508 P.2d 366 (1973) . . .

19

State v. Ccrlr-y, 49 Del. 281, 114 A.2d 805 (1955)

lg

State of Alaiarra v. Hunter, 67 Ala. 81 (1880)

18

State v. Johnson, 216 Minn. 427, 13 N.W.2d 26 (1944)

19

State v. Nerini, 61 Ariz. 503, 151 P.2d 983 (1944)

19

Van Buskirk v. Todd, 269 Cal. App. 2d 680, 75 Cal. Rptr. 280
(1969)
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92
S. Ct. 1400 (1972)

22
9

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated 77-60-15

19

Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22

1, 2, 11
12, 13
15

Utah Code Annotated 78-12-36(b)(1)

21

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-1

7, 16

Table of Contents Cont.
Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-l (1953, as amended 1965)
Utah Code Annotated 78-45 (a) (1)

...

2, 5, 7
4

Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-2

21

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-2 (4)

4

Utah Code Annotated 78-45-3

4

Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-3

13, 20

AUTHORITIES CITED
10 Am. Jur., Trials, 678-679

17, 18

10 An. Jur. 2i 848-849

3
R = Record

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALLY M. MARTINEZ and the STATE OF
UTAH, by and through UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
i-'iaimixi:^ ci;;u Appellants,

No. 14573

EUGEMIO T'"'' 13O.MES0,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF "F " - P ^ I . ^ M T S

STATEMENT C? THE :iAIU3E OF THE CASE
:•: oellants, State •?- Utah ard Sally M. Martinez, appeal from
a*1^ crdar rer -red acramst anr-^e ^ \ ~^—_--. i ^ r^ i i M ; L* *

-

r

Judicial District, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granting respondent's
!*otio:: . ;imiss> ,:_»:•.! thcrcl / IvirrW-c: • ^v action to establish paternity
of co-plaintiff' s minor child.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOV1ER COURT
Following the filir.q and serving of the complaint co initiate
paternity proceedings,. *-•';* c^ur

di^ru^t^. the -:~ta'^ h~s-*'

ant's claim "that the statute of limitations had run.

<:«=?c^r:a-

The court held

that a paterni ty action v/as controlled by Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22,

RLLILF SLIGHT 0^; APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of t. .? lower COK^Z.-^

..•:.'J;

meraoranduin decision holding "that the establishment of paternity and the

liability to support does not exist unless the action is carrmenced within
eight years and request that this case be regarded and the complaint
reinstated so as to permit the processes of the court action to take
place.

STATEMENT CF FACTS
The co-plaintiff, Sally M. Martinez, gave birth to a child
out of wedlock on January 25, 1968. Co-plaintiff and defendant, Eugenio
Max Rcmero, were not married at the time of birth or conception of the
child and defendant has refused to acknowledge said child as his own.
The State of Utah and Sally M. Martinez filed a ccmplaint
against the defendant on the 27th day of January, 1976, alleging that
the defendant was the father of co-plaintiff's illegitimate child and,
as such, was to be declared the legal and natural father of the child
and was liable for the reasonable expenses of pregnancy and confinement
of co-plaintiff and the education and necessary support of said child
by virtue of Utah Code Annotated 78-4Ea-l (1953, as amended 1965).

The

State seeks judgment against the defendant in the amount of Four Thousand One Hundred Dollars ($4,100.00)

for the aforementioned expenses

which were provided for co-plaintiff and her minor child frcm February,
1972, through January, 1976, by the Social Services Department, and
that the defendant also be ordered to pay the amount of Seventy-five
Dollars ($75.00) per month as reasonable support and maintenance for
the child.
This case came before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss.

After taking the matter under advisenent, the court ruled that Utah

Code Ann. 78-12-22 controlled all actions for the establishment of
paternity.
-2-

ARGUMENT .••
POINT I ;"'
A FATHER OV'ES TIJF SAME 01/'Y OF SUPPORT T"
BOTH LEGITIMATE AHD ILEEG; TE'AT1; CHILDREN.
" •"

Vnctard was saim; to he

the child of noLoc\ , -;.i "ij-i^r; oonnll."

-y. <_•

}!

f ilius

..I'IE

.•--'-

s

": f e s s e n c e , the illegitimate child nad n o Aether k n o w n to t h e
lav

-..!. -..:- j ; Li- ..:.

•. ;;

••* si " e r ^ * ' • =>• '•- .-o '-• . a n a a

was disqualified from certain ofric :sts

v

/stnrcl

Al \ji. J u r . A* ^.., - O ^

MO;-T rt"-:t-:-5 have since m i t i g a t e d r o x e or less the nicer;.; o:
the cc:~;:. -aw and conferred u p o n ... i .:.cji ,. = .-• ,
which, c h a : .aw p r e v i o u s l y

471

A}:;

i. ;.'." •>

../•-.-;

eenied.

the court', ^.eld thai t h e w o r d s * o n , *. o.

n •
_ _ _-_• i"

in a w r o n g f u l d e a t h statute m e a n t that t h e d e a t h action w a s
for t h e benefit of decedei it ! s wi f e, husbai id, "chi 1 d or chil dren !t w h i c h included I l l e g i t i m a t e a s w e l l a s l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d ren of deceased p a r e n t s :
,!

The r e a s o n for this iron.

• ^j.fui

••

b e c o m i n g progressively m o r e a w a r e that c h i l d r e n d e s e r v e proper
ca. . ,

.!•'": :•']• - = ro ty.-h -i ^r, t-vr^.

The bux Jen ol illegitimacy

i£ they :n" o 1 1 lecritimace*

in purely social r oiatrLc/uniips

shoulA h e nroiv;'\ e i t h o u t society adding a m i e c o s s a r i ly ho the
bar cier:

UJWLU

._-jyu .•_.. :> > s n* - i.w-::

health,, and w e l f a r e of c h i l d r e n . "
-3-

*

-

r

Utah law is clearly in line with the modern
trend which recognizes that all children need and deserve
proper care. Under Utah Code Annotated 78-45(a)(1) of the
"Uniform Act on Paternity," the father is liable " . . . to
the same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock
• . . for the education". . . and "necessary support . . .
of the child."

In further clarifying the exact meaning

of the above cited statute, one must turn to the companion
statutes to understand the intent of the law.
Annotated 78-45-3 states:

Utah Code

"Every man shall support his wife

and his child."(Emphasis added.) "Child," as defined under
Section 78-45-2(4), "means a son or daughter under the
age of twenty-one years and a son or daughter of whatever
age who is incapacitated from earning a living and without
sufficient means." (Emphasis added.)
Even before the enactment of the above quoted statutes, this court has long recognized the absolute nature
of the father's support duty:

a father has "a positive

duty to support his minor child."
P.2d 262, 107 U. 239 (1944).

Jenkins v. Jenkins, 153

In Rockwood v. Rockwood, 236

P. 457, 65 U. 261 (1925), this court stated that "the duty
of the father to support his children, if he is able to do
so, is imposed in this state by positive statute.

It

would be his duty in any event if there were no statute upon

the sub-:'-:"1

^ r.i.ore recent cas-i, Rees v . A r c h i b a l d f

6 U t a h .... ,,w .
-

:

"This court h a s invariably e m p h a s i s e c
the father's o b l i g a t i o n to support h i s
children based u p o n t h e elementary p r i n c i ple that t h e law imposes u p o n those w h o
bring children into t h e world t h e duty : o
care for and support them, during their
m i n o r i t y and dependency. ! ' ( emphasis added.)
Given r he eori : n\i:\! - v

s u p p o r t end t h e
t i o n a:
it

r-"a ; -h--'r * :•. • v . )L

l e g i s l a t i v e g r , ? r t of e q u a l r i g h t s

- -;=;..--' ' ^ n r - ^ ^

is ;.o;:::ul

]

•-- a"11 ^ ' ' i 1 - ^ ^

c h a t t h e -Le-irjiaeer^.

of e a e : 1' ^ r i t i n a t e c h i l d

IIUJIJIL1

te such p u r p o r t

• .'.•;-

i l 1 e / i - : r a : » 2 c h i - 1 " f"
t h a e e f t h e 1,.,.

- ..v'.,3

should forever
*~ , .d^f

e i g n e yd... : a^ h e l d by t h e l e - 7 e r c c u . h

l

t ^ Lig.,;

b? s e o e o r f e d by i t s f a t h e r
-

_:I^CJ

, -

ociuca-

( 7 8 - 4 5 a - l , supra)

b a r r e l ::er-ey L v e , )

to

^.

,

be

'/Irhin
..: k j

a^> o p p o s e d

*

if abrcrille by a statute ;;f limitations w h i c h rune uur ir.g
th*"- v.". .' :': - ire- :: -

~\ ' ••': a n action to e s t a b l i s h p a t e r n i

and enforce the support d u t y ,
P O I N T TT
TO BAR A P A T E R N I T Y ACTION 3 Y A C H I L D , P A R E N T ,
O R PUBLIC AGENCY DURING T H E C H I L D ' S M I N O R I T Y
IS A D E N I A L OF E Q U A L PROTECTION OF T H E L A W S
AND OF T H E R I G H T S A N I L L E G I T I M A T E C H I L D H A S
F O R SUPPORT.
CT

;

hi

corn o u t of wed"': ^cb have t h " same r i g h t s

to s u p p o r t , e d u c a t i o n , and necessi.ic:; ae ,.• •-* . ^
legitimate channels.

r~ • .M

T h e laws of ehe Seate oc Utah r e c o g n i z
-5-

all children whether legitimate or not as equals.

To buy

the position of the lower court does away with this recognition of "equality" and once again places on a child "after
eight years" the stigma of the early common law of being
"filius nullius" if an action has not been brought in that
time period.

To take such a position removes from society

the progress made in the recognition of rights and becomes
overt-rank discrimination against a child who had no say
in its conception, birth, or early life. Much too often, a
young child does not know the legal, moral, societal implications until several years beyond what the court has held
is the time for the action to commence.
The United States Supreme Court entertained questions on the rights of illegitimate children as compared to
those of legitimate children in Gomez v. Perez, 4 09 U.S.
535, 93 S. Ct. 872 (1973), and drew the following conclusion:
" . . . Once a state posits a
judicially enforceable right on behalf
of children to needed support from their
natural fathers, there is no constitutionally
sufficient justification for denying such
essential right to a child simply because
/the7 natural father has not married /the7
mother, and such denial is a denial of equal
protection."
What are these "judicially enforceable" rights?
First of all, the duty of suppoirt was discussed in point one
of this brief.

Rees v. Archibald, supra, specifically spells

out this duty as does Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-l and 78-45-1,
et seq.

Further, the Colorado Supreme Court said as stated

in Garvin v. Garvin, 108 Colo. 415, 118 P.2d 768 (1941):
"The primary liability of the father to, his minor child always exists during minority." (Emphasis added J
Need the "judicially enforceable" rights under
Utah law be any clearer to fall under the mandate of Gomez?
No.

There must be equality in the application of the right

to support.
wise.

The lower court in the case at bar feels other-

The obvious inequality is seen in this case.

If the

child in question had been born of a marriage with a "known"
father, that child would be able to call upon that father
for needs and support through its entire minority.

However,

under the logic of the lower court, if the parent, guardian,
public agency, or child does not bring an action within eight
years, the child is forever barred from claiming any familial
relationship to one he could call father.

I
What the lower court in effect has done is say
that an illegitimate child has an equal right to its father's
support only where suit has been brought on its behalf
within an eight-year period, whereas the legitimate child's
right to support extends through its entire minority regardless of any attempt to bring suit to enforce the support obligation.
-7-

The defendant based his motion to dismiss on the
fact that "an essential purpose of the statute of limitations
is to avoid putting a defending party in an untenable position.

Here, the defendant claims the benefit of the stat-

utes because it is, as a practical matter, impossible for
him to adequately prove a defense."

Although there may be

problems in defense, the Supreme Court has nonetheless held
in Gomez, supra, that once the right of support has been
granted "there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such essential right. . . . "

Such a de-

nial constitutes a "denial of equal protection."
There is no indication that the legislature intended
that there be any exception to the general rule of support.
Further, mere problems of evidence would hardly justify discrimination between children when dealing with their essential right to support.

Policy aside, it is the plaintiff

who has the burden of proof and whose task will become increasingly difficult with the passage of time.

Defendants

apprehension in regard to evidence is not sufficient reason for denying children the right of support from their
natural fathers--not to mention the interests of the state
and its taxpayers.
If the rights of legitimate and illegitimate
children are to be equal, an illegitimate must at all times
-8-

during its minority be granted the right to prove paternity
either by iself or through its mother or agency charged with
its care.

Otherwise, the illegitimate child's right to sup-

port depends solely on the diligence of its mother or guardian, whose failure to act would, at an early age, reduce
him to the status of welfare recipient and deny him forever
the right to enjoy the economic benefits and social rights
belonging to its legitimate counterparts*
That a state may not invidiously discriminate
against illegitimate children by denying them substantial
benefits accorded children generally is firmly supported by
case law.

A state may not, for example, create a right

of action in favor of children for the wrongful death of a
parent and exclude illegitimate children from the benefit
of such a right.
1509 (1968).

Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct.

Nor may illegitimate children be excluded from

sharing equally with other children in the recovery of workmen1 s compensation benefits for the death of their parent.
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct.
1400 (1972) .

Where, as in the instant case, a continuing

right to support has been created for all children, a complete bar to action resulting from failure to prove paternity
within eight years discriminates unfairly against illegitimates.

As stated by the court in New Jersey Welfare Rights

Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 622, 93 S. Ct. 1700 (1973):
11

. . . imposing disabilities on
the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility and wrongdoing."
Thus, this court should not make it more difficult
for illegitimate children to live in our society than it
already is.

Very few children know the significance of what

this controversy centers around at the age of eight.

There-

fore, not only should this court protect the rights of the
illegirir.ate child who had no control over its circumstances
but shouli permit the person or agency broad lee-way to use
the avail, le laws for the benefit of the child.

Ofttimes,

the no:;/.: of an illegitimate child becomes incensed at the
fact than sr.e has become pregnant and despises the natural
father for many years.

Should this fact be a bar to the

mother bringing an action when she realizes there is some
material and psychological benefit to the child?

To say so

would deny to such children a sacred right of parentage and
would discriminate against them because of something they had
no control over.
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 78-12-22 IS NO BAR
TO BRINGING PATERNITY ACTIONS, BUT IS
MEANT TO BE A STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF ESTABLISHED COURT ORDERS
OF SUPPORT.
-10-

The lower court, in its minute entry as well as
in the final order signed, based the dismissal on the belief that Utah Code Annotated 7 8-12-22 (as amended) controlled
paternity actions.
11

The pertinent language is as follows:

—Within eight years:

An action upon a judgment or decree
of any court of the United States, or of
any state or territory within the United
States.
An action to enforce any liability
due or to become due, for failure to provide support or maintenance for dependent
children." (Emphasis added.)
The purpose of the above statute, as seen by the
appellants, is not to completely bar the bringing of a
paternity action to "establish familial relationships" but
limits only an obligor's liability for support up to eight
years after a sum certain has been ordered or decreed.

The

statute must be read in light of the intent of the l a w — t o
allow support for dependents.

The language "liability due

or to become due" was added in 1975 to codify the position
this court took in Seely v. Park, 532 P.2d 684 (Utah, 1975).
In that case, the mother was awarded custody of a minor
child and defendant was ordered to pay $40 per month for
its support.

The defendant failed to abide by the support

order and a subsequent action to enforce the order was
initiated by the woman.

His arrearage was $5,8 00 for

twelve years and one month.

Although no action was brought
-11-

within eight years, this court did not hold that the child
had lost all right to enforcement of that liability upon
the amount which was due or to become due; instead, the
court held that defendant's liability on the arrearage was
limited to arrearages accumulated within a period of eight
years—i.e., $3,840 (96 x $40).
The court in Seely, Id., quoted Simmons v. Simmons,
105 Utah 574, 144 P.2d 528 (1943), as follows:
"When a judgment is rendered, payable
in installments, the statute begins to-run
against the judgment from the time fixed
for the payment of each installment for the
part then payable." (Emphasis added.)
The abe-.-o * anguage demonstrates that the application of Utah
Code Ar.nc-^ced 78-12-22 is limited to actions brought to enforce judgments, orders, or decrees of the court that fix
sum certain amounts for support.

Failure to bring an action

on this liability due or to become due does not totally
eliminate a minor's right to receive support payments from
its father.

Instead, it serves to limit the liability due

to an eight year period.

Thus, a minor would not be barred

from bringing an action beyond the eight year period but
would be barred from collecting the amounts due beyond the
statutory limitation.
Appellants are quick to point out, however, that tne
eight year statute does not control support obligations in
paternity matters.

The Uniform Paternity Act has specific

provision for limitation of reimbursement of necessary
-12-

expenses before the date paternity is established.

The

eight year statute of limitation on liability would not begin
to run until the liability is fixed by court order.

Until

then, the shorter statute of four years preceding the action controls, Utah Code Annotated 7 8-4 5a-3 states:
11

—The fatherf s liabilities for past
education and necessary support are limited
to a period of four years next preceding
the commencement of an action." (Emphasis
added.)
It would seem only logical from the above language
that actions for support can be brought beyond the four years
"next preceding" the cormencenent of the action. Otherwise,
the phraseology would be meaningless.

The same applies to

Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22. That language limits only the
amounts due on sums certain.

Since the Paternity Act con-

trols the collection of necessities, limiting it to four
years, the thrust of both statutes is to leave entirely
alone the matter of "when" a paternity action can be brought.
The opinion of the lower court which denies the
natural mother, public agency obligated to provide its care,
and the child itself to bring actions after an eight year
period has gone by does not align itself with Utah law which
provides that support goes until age 21. The Maine Supreme
Court had a similar situation before it in Harding v.
Skolfield, 125 Me. 438, 134 A. 567 (1926).

There, a pater-

nity suit was filed when the illegitimate child was 13 years
-13-

old.

The court held the suit to be timely and said the

statute of limitations v;as no bar to the action because such
an obligation is a continuing one and is not over in the
number of years claimed under the statute of limitations.
This court should take cognizance from the above
case.

Just like the period of liability for support—8

years—is a shifting time period, so is the period for establishing paternity.
to 21.

In the State of Utah, that period goes

Whether the moving party is the child, the woman or

the public agency makes no difference.

The entire purpose

of either of the aforementioned parties bringing an action
is to establish a familial relationship for the child and
have the father of the child support it as do the fathers
of children born legitimately.

By prohibiting one of the

above named persons to establish paternity for the benefit
of the child, it is totally inconsistent with the intent and
meaning of the law.

To permit the action secures for the

child social security benefits of the father, industrial
compensation, inheritance, etc.

To deny this is a judicial

decree declaring that the child "SHALL ALWAYS REMAIN A
BASTARD.1'
POINT 3V
ACTIONS TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY ARE NOT CONTROLLED
BY EXISTING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. THE ACT
ITSELF WAS PURPOSELY SILENT THEREON, AND IT WAS,
THEREFORE, ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO HOLD THAT
THE ACTION WAS SO CONTROLLED.
-14-

Despite the continuing nature of a father's support
obligation, the defendant argued in the court below that "/S/n
essential purpose of the statute of limitati ons is to avoid putting
a defending party in an untenable position."

(R. 6)

He further

argued that because no statute of limitations is found in the body
of the Uniform Paternity Act, the four year bastardy limitation was
applicable. With this, the defendant makes two false assumptions.
First, he falsely assumes that the civil action to establish paternity is governed by any statute of limitations. Secondly, he falsely
assures that, the limitation under the bastardy statute applies to the
Unif c m .-irt.
"* though defendant does have a legitimate concern regarding
his defence;, tne mere passage of years goes to the weight of the evidence arri rrast, as in most cases, be resolved by judge and jury. Obviously, the longer a plaintifffs delay, the more difficult his burden
of proof will beccme. As stated by the court in Ortega v. Portales,
134 Colo. 537, 307 P.2d 193 (1957):
"The infant child cannot be deprived of
its right to continued parental care and support
by failure on the part of any person to act within
a limited time following its birth. The lapse of
time may add to the difficulties of proof concerning the essential facts upon which liability may
depend, but this does not mean that the pertinent
facts cannot be judicially determined."
In regard to defendant's first false assumption, the role
of Utah Code Annotated 78-12-22 has already been discussed.

As indi-

cated in that discussion and alluded to here, the Uniform Act on
Paternity contains no specific limitation period.
-15-

Had the state.

legislature intended to place a time limitation upon the bringing of
such an action, it would have specifically so provided.

Since the

primary purpose of a paternity proceeding is to secure the support
aixl education of the child rather than to punish the father, it only
follows that the legislative intent was to ensure that the child would
have the right to support during its entire minority.

This has long

been recognized in Utah case law. This court said, in Rockwood v.
Rpctovood, supra:
"The duty of the father to support his
children . . . is imposed in this state by
positive statute. It voild be his duty in any
event if there were no statute upon the subject."
And, in Rees

v. Archibald, supra:

"This court has invariably emphasized the
father' s obligation to support his children based
upon the elementary principle that the law imposes
upon those who bring children into the vjorld the
duty to care for and support than during their
minority ard dependency."
In Rees, Id., this court held that a divorce decree did
not affect the defendant's responsibility for his son's support and the
expenses of care given him.

In arriving at this holding, the court

chose that rule of law which gave " . . . primary consideration to
the rights and needs of the children."

Thus, Utah law appears to

follow the rule that the obligation of a father to support his child,
legitimate or illegitimate, is continuing and terminates only when the
child reaches its majority under a provision of the divorce decree or
paternity order, or 21 years under Utah Code Annotated 78-45-1, et
seq., if the decrees or orders are silent or if there are no orders.
To apply a statute of limitations not specifi cally provided for by
the legislature to paternity actions would permit putative fathers to
-16-

escape his continuing obligation to support "his" child if his child
it "is."
^

£EL* J u r * Trials 678-679 discusses the bastardy statutes

and the evolution of the fact that the Uniform Act on Paternity had no
limitations-

In that discussion is found a definitive statement regard-

ing the lack of a statute of limitations under the Uniform Paternity
Act;
"The original bastardy statutes, creating a new
cause of action, usually established a specific and
quite short period of time within which the action
could be brought. In most cases the running of the
statute started with the birth of the child, and the
action by the mother had to be brought within a period of fran one to three years* Seme statutes stipuj^zed that an action -could be brought by the local
,: :ency when the child was or was likely to becane a
^iic charge. If there was any limitation on the
~ ringing of such action, the statute usually did not
begin to run until the child did beccme a public
charge.
Usually the statute was tolled by written acknowledgment of paternity or by the furnishing of support.
The written acknowledgment must have been unequivocal
and the payment of support reasonably regular, not
merely sporadic.
Many if not all of the state laws continue to
reflect such provisions. However, as the views of
society in respect to the responsibility of the
father change37 a n d after statutes were enactecT making it a crime for the father wilfully to fail to
support an illegitimate child, the theory evolved
that each day's failure to support constituted a new
crime; thus, for all practical purposes the statute
would never run.
This view is also reflected in seme of the modern
paternity statutes. The Uniform Paternity Act has no
limitations on bringing the action, but recovery carTbe
had only for the necessary support supplied during the
four years next preceding the carmencecnent of the action."
(Bnphasis added.)
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Thus, for something so important, basic, and sacred as
the establishment of paternity, none of the existing "general" statutes do or can apply.

The act itself, as indicated in An. Jur. Trials,

Id., specifically deleted the limitation because the drafters of that
law recognized this inherent right of the illegitimate.
This more enlightened view which ccmports with the policy
of Utah law giving " . . . primary consideration to the rights and
needs of the children" has long been applied in other jurisdictions.
In State of Alabama v. Hunter, 67 Ala. 81 (1880), a bastardy proceeding wherein no specific statutory limitation had been prescribed in
the bastardy statute itself, the court stated:
"We can see good reasons why no statute
;: limitations was prescribed to bar such proceed. ,~;s. They are chiefly intended for the public
jLTuemnity, and to coerce the putative father to
support and maintain the unfortunate child."
111

State v. Cordrey, 49 Del. 281, 114 A.2d 805 (1955), the father was

charged with failure to support his illegitimate child.

The court

recognized non-support as a continuing crime:
" . . . The defendant in this case is
charged with non-support which the law recognizes
as a continuing crime. In crimes of this nature,
the statute does not begin to run frem the occurrence of the initial act, which may in itself enbody all the elements of the crime, but frcm the
occurrence of the most recent act. The duty to
support the child is a contin uing duty and
the failure to support it is a continuing offense,
and the parent will be subject to prosecution at
any time during the continuance of the wilful
neglect to support the child as provided by the
statute."
-18-

A more recent case, State v. Christensen, 19 Ariz.
App. 479, 503 P.2d 366 (1973), held that a one year statute of limitations on actions on liability created by statute did not bar an
action by the mother against the alleged father which was brought
two years after the childf s birth to determine paternity and compel
support.

The Arizona court followed the policy enunciated in State

v. Nerini, 61 Ariz. 503, 151 P.2d 983 (1944), where, after observing
that the bastardy article did not contain sections limiting the time
in which the proceedings might be instituted, the court cormented:
"The statute is entirely free frcm any
bar of this kind, and indeed there should not be,
for the obligation of a father to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, is a continuing
duty against which limitation will not run during
the time the child needs such care and support. We
cannot conceive that the legislature ever intended
to limit the time in which such proceedings could
be instituted and prosecuted."
And, in State v. Johnson, 216 Minn. 427, 13 N.W.2d 26 (1944):
"The rule that the statute of limitations does
not run until the liability has ceased to continue
rests upon the principle that where the obligation
is continuing in nature the breach or violation of
duty continues so long as the obligation continues,
and that the cause of action or penalty, as the case
may be, must be deemed to be continually accruing
during the entire time the obligation and the breach
thereof continue."
Regarding the second false assuirption, not as much need be
said. Utah Code Annotated 77-60-15 is a limitation of bastardy proceedings to 4 years. It says:
"No prosecution under this Chapter ^^stard^7
shall be brought after four years frcm the birth of
such child . . . "
(Emphasis and Brackets added.)
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The defendant himself in his Motion to Dismiss (R, 5) states:

"This

provision is limited to the chapter on bastardy.11
If the legislature had meant for the four year statute
to apply to the Uniform Paternity Act, it would have so indicated •
Furthermore, the more recent act, a Uniform Act, would not likely be
circumscribed by a state bastardy statute originally passed in 1911.
Also, Section 78-45a-3 would be rendered meaningless if the four year
statute were to govern. The language "rarmencement of an action" with
a liability limitation of four years thereon strongly implies that more
than one action could be brought—this being so, application of the fouryear statute would be incongruous.
Surely, if the legislature and the authors of the Uniform
Paternity Act had wanted to limit the time within which paternity could
be established either by the act itself or through use of the Bastardy
Act, they would have so provided. A matter of such importance would
not have been deleted without a good reason—that reason being that the
basic rights of all children and the duty of fathers to provide for
their support should not be subject to arbitrary, unjust limitations
which would bar the child frcm exercising its rights to parental establishment.

POINT V
IF ANY STATUTE OF LU4ITATI0NS IS FOUND TO
CONTROL, SAID LIMITATION IS TOLLED DURING THE
CHILD'S MINORITY AND AN ACTION BROUGHT DURING
THE MINORITY OF THE CSHD IS PROPER.
-20-

Should this court find that the eight year (or any other
length) statute of limitation controls paternity actions, such limitations do not bar the bringing of the action during the child's
minority. Whether the mother, child, or public agency charged with
the child's support initiates and brings the action does not matter.
The "real" party in interest in all of the above situations is only one
person—the child.
Utah Code Annotated 78-12-35 (b) (1) makes it clear that
the limitation period does not run during minority.

The pertinent

language is i3 follows:
"If a person entitled to bring an action . . .
at the time the cause of action accrued under
;. :- age of majority the tire of such disability is
" " a oart of the tir.e limited for the coitmencanent
. the action." (Rxfoasis added.)
The present action frcs this category exactly.

The child

was eight years and two days old when the ac tion was filed. The child
has 10 years remaining for its minority.

Pursuant to the above stat-

ute, the limitation of time is tolled until majority is reached. However, in analysis of the foregoing, it is called to the court's attention that Utah Code Annotated 78-45a-2 allows the mother, public
agency, or child to bring the action in its own name, or together.

In

connection therewith, the child has a right to bring the action and,
thus, by the language of 78-12-36 (b) (1), the period is tolled.
The argument undoubtedly will be raised that the suit is
brought in the name of the state and the mother and not that of the
child.

Therefore, since neither the state nor the mother are in their

minority, the statute of limitations should run. -Appellants would like
-21-

to respond to this in the following iranner:
If this court agrees with the above provision, the mother
could petition the court to be appointed guardian-ad-liteu.

In essence,

she is doing now in her own name the same thing she would do as a
"guardian-ad-litena," which is to pursue the interests of the child.
Further, as indicated previously, the "real" party, no matter whose
name appears on the title of the action, is the "child" and not the
mother or the State of Utah. Of course, the State would benefit
financially because of the fact that an established paternity would
permit collection of support from the natural father when the child is
on welfare.

However, the greater benefit derived directly by the

child greatly outweighs the few dollars collected for welfare reimbursement •
The California Supreme Court, in Van Buskirk v. Todd, 269
Cal. App. 2d 680, 75 Cal. Bptr.
position, above.

280 (1969), followed appellant's

In that case, the mother of an illegitimate child

initiated an action to determine paternity through a bastardy action.
The court held that a bastardy action should be considered frcm the
standpoint of the child as the real party in interest, and that the
statute of limitations in the paternity phase of such an action is
tolled at all times from the birth of the child until his majority,
or until an action for paternity is brought on his behalf.

The

court also stated that the tolling of the statute during the minority
of the child in question was not terminated by the bringing of an
earlier paternity-support action which was voluntarily dismissed by
-22-

the child's representative. The court analogized the instant case
to one in which a guardian ad litem voluntarily discontinues an
action brought on behalf of an infant, and where the general rule is
that the rights of the infant are not prejudiced thereby, and that
he may still take advantage of his disability, the action not being
barred until the lapse of the statutory period after he beccmes of
age.
Further, the same court reiterated its position in 1971
when it decided Perez v. Singh, 21 Cal* App. 3c} 870, 97 Cal. Rptr.
920 (1971). An attempt to have the paternity action defeated by
laches was there encountered by the court. The court said that in an
action to establish the paternity of an illegitimate child and to obtain support for that child, brought by x±se mother on behalf of the
child, the child is the real party in interest, and the statute of
limitations on the paternity aspect of the case is tolled during
the minority of the child.

The court stated that the obligation

of a father to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, is a continuing duty against which th e statute of limitations
does not run during the time that the child needs such support.
The court felt that the result would be no different if the ccmplaint
was indeed considered to raise equitable issued, since the action
would be brought on the child's behalf, all benefits derived frcm
it would belong to the child, and therefore laches could not be
imputed to the child during its minority•
-23-

Appellants contend that the two preceding California cases
present the law this court should follow.

Since the right to support

does belong to the child and could, under the lower court ruling,
forever be lost through no fault of his own at the age of eight years,
the action should be considered frcm the standpoint of the child as the
real party in interest. Where, as in the instant case, the person is
affected by a recognized legal disability and a continuing duty of
support exists, the interests of the child and society must not be
limited by an arbitrary imposition of statutory limitation during a
child13 minority.

co^cmsiait~a interests of illegitimate children should be of great
concern of this court.

In a day and age where more illegitimacy oc-

curs, the natural fathers who indiscriminately feel sex is a play
toy should be required to support those children they bring into the
world.

To prohibit this frcm taking place, the taxpayers of this

state will be called upon to support more and more children "whose
fathers can hide behind the technical cloak of the law."
It is appellants1 position that the lower court mast be
reversed and the complaint reinstated so as to allow discovery processes to take place to determine the actual paternity of the child.
There is nothing more basic to our society than to have that right.
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